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REGULATING VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS: 
IS THE INVISIBLE HAND PICKING THE POCKETS 
OF THE TERMINALLY ILL? 
Russell J. Herron* 
The newly emerging viatical settlement industry has attracted 
considerable attention from both insurance regulators and advo-
cates for the terminally ill. In a viatical settlement, a terminally ill 
person names a viatical settlement company as beneficiary under 
his life insurance policy in exchange for an immediate lump-sum 
cash payment of less than face value of the policy. To date, viatical 
settlement payments to people with AIDS (PWAs) have been dis-
turbingly low as a percentage of the face value of PWA policies. 
This Note examines the few enacted viatical settlement regulations 
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' model 
regulations as they particularly relate to PWAs). Acknowledging the 
importance of viatical settlements as a source of income for finan-
cially-strapped PWAs, this Note argues for a regulatory scheme in 
which PWAs receive greater protections and higher payouts than 
they receive in the current unregulated market, while still allowing 
viatical companies a reasonable return commensurate with the 
actual risks and costs of the viatical business. Part I argues that 
consumer protection rationales justify licensing and disclosure 
regulations. Part II explores controversial proposals for minimum 
payout regulations of viatical settlement providers, and concludes 
that such regulations, if carefully crafted, are warranted. Finally, 
Part III examines the advent of accelerated benefits provisions in 
life insurance policies as alternatives to viatical settlements. 
INTRODUCTION 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) often renders 
its victims unable to work at a time when they most need a 
steady income. A recent estimate places the average medical 
cost of AIDS treatment, from full-blown AIDS to death, at 
* Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 28, 
1995. B.A. 1991, University of Michigan; J.D. 1995, University of Michigan Law 
School. I am grateful to Professor David L. Chambers of the University of Michigan 
Law School for his thoughtful comments and guidance throughout the writing of this 
Note. 
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$69,100 per patient.1 Such a bill can easily bankrupt even 
those people with AIDS (PW As) who are able to continue to 
work until the last few months before death. As a result, many 
PW As not only face premature death; many also must face 
death in poverty. Mounting bills can exact a heavy psycholog-
ical toll on PW As at a time when they need peace of mind. As 
one advocate for PWAs noted, "There is no dignity in facing the 
last days of one's life as part of the indigent poor."2 In fact, if 
financial worries contribute to depression, they may even 
hasten death. 3 
A 1992 survey distributed to 30,000 PWAs and HIV-positive 
individuals confirmed the extent of the financial need ofPWAs.4 
The National Association of People with AIDS (NAPWA) found 
that over 50% of respondents had difficulty paying for medicine, 
clothing, transportation, housing, and food.5 Almost 30% report-
ed living on less than $500 per month, while another 30% 
struggled to get by on between $500 and $1000 per month.6 
NAPWA also estimated that as many as 50% of PW As own life 
insurance. 7 Although many of the survey's financially needy 
individuals probably also lack life insurance, NAPWA's survey 
suggests that techniques which would allow PW As to obtain 
money from their life insurance policies could benefit a substan-
tial number of PW As. 
1. Lifetime AIDS Treatment Cost Set at $119,274 by U.S. Agency, AIDS POL 'v & 
L., Aug. 6, 1993, at 3. For a detailed discussion of the costs of AIDS treatment, see Lee 
Ann Dean, Note, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Viatical Settlement, and the 
Health Care Crisis: AIDS Patients Reach Into the Future to Make Ends Meet, 25 
RUTGERS L.J. 117, 122-27 (1993). 
2. Life Insurance (A) Committee, lB NAT'L AsS'N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS PROC. 
779, 787 (1993) (statement of William J. Freeman, Executive Director, National 
Association of People with AIDS, Dec. 7, 1992) [hereinafter Freeman Statement]. 
3. See Depression May Accelerate HN Disease Progression, AIDS ALERT, Sept. 
1992, at 140 (reporting the results of a study finding that "depression accelerates 
declines in CD4 counts among HIV-infected people, and therefore, may hasten disease 
progression and death"). For a discussion of the role ofCD-4 cell counts in predicting 
life expectancies, see infra Part 11.B.1. 
4. See Freeman Statement, supra note 2, at 786. 
5. Id. at 787. Because almost 80% of the surveys respondents were white, id., 
the survey probably understates the financial difficulties of PW As by under represent-
ing African-American and Latino populations-groups disproportionately affected by 
unemployment and poverty. 
6. Freeman Statement, supra note 2, at 787. 
7. Id. 
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One such technique, the "viatical settlement,"8 was developed 
in the late 1980s as a response to the financial needs of PW As 
and other terminally ill people. In a viatical settlement, a 
terminally ill policyholder (the viator) assigns the death benefit 
of his policy to a viatical settlement provider9 (the company), 
in exchange for an immediate payment ofless than the expect-
ed death benefit of the policy.10 By the terms of the agreement, 
the entire death benefit is paid to the viatical settlement 
provider upon the viator's death. Although viatical settlements 
theoretically could be available to anyone with a dramatically 
shortened life expectancy, the vast majority ofviatical settle-
ments have been undertaken by PW As, with terminal cancer 
patients comprising much of the remainder. 11 
From the viator's perspective, the viatical transaction itself 
is fairly simple. The applicant contacts as many viatical 
settlement providers as he wishes and fills out detailed appli-
cation forms, typically consisting of a questionnaire, 12 an 
8. The term "viatical" comes from the Latin word "viaticum," which means both 
the Eucharist "administered to a person near or in danger of death," and "[a) supply 
or official allowance of money for a journey." 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 3572 (1993). , 
9. A viatical settlement provider should be distinguished from a viatical 
settlement broker. Viatical settlement providers enter into the actual viatical 
agreements themselves, purchasing from the viator the right to become the irrevocable 
beneficiary under his policy. VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(0) (Nat'l Ass'n 
oflns. Comm'rs 1994) [hereinafter VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT). In contrast, 
viatical brokers offer to find viatical settlements for a fee or otherwise introduce or 
act as intermediaries between viators and viatical settlement providers. Id. § 2(B). 
This Note focuses solely on viatical settlement providers, and the generic term "compa-
ny" refers to a viatical settlement provider. 
10. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) defines "viatical 
settlement contract" in the VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 2(C). 
The NAIC's definition is broader than the one I have given, but not in a way that is 
relevant to this Note. 
11. This Note focuses on PWAs because they constitute the bulk ofviatical con-
sumers. See Michael Quint, Pre-Death Cash: A Business Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
1994, at Dl, D2 (noting that terminal cancer patients currently make up only 10% 
of viators). Most of the discussion that follows will focus on issues of particular 
relevance to PWAs, although many of the conclusions reached apply equally to other 
via tors. 
12. For example, the questionnaire of Life Benefactors, L.P., a California viatical 
provider, requests information about the applicant's current employment, receipt of 
means-based government assistance, family relationships, medical history, and life 
insurance policy. See Life Benefactors, L.P., Questionnaire 1-4 (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The medical history questions focus 
on the applicant's CD-4 cell count, the names of his treating hospitals and physicians, 
and the types of treatment he has been receiving for his condition. Id. 
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authorization to release medical records, 13 and an authoriza-
tion to release insurance policy information. Once the viatical. 
provider has received all of the information, its panel of physi-
cians evaluates the applicant's records and renders an opinion 
to the provider as to the applicant's prognosis.14 If the provider 
finds that the applicant has a sound insurance policy and, in 
consultation with its physicians, finds that the applicant has 
a qualifying condition that results in a life expectancy of less 
than two years, the provider then calculates a purchase price. 
and makes an offer . to the applicant. 15 The offer typically 
amounts to between fifty and eighty percent of the policy's face 
value.16 If the applicant accepts the offer, the provider and 
applicant (now aviator) sign the purchase documents, which 
include a purch~se agreement for the policy, a change of 
ownership form, and a change of beneficiary form. 17 The latter 
two forms then are forwarded to the viator's life insurance 
company, which records the information, files the documents, 
and sends a confirmation to the viator. Once the viatical 
provider receives confirmation of the changes; it pays the 
viator, in a lump sum, the full amount of the viatical settle-
ment, either by cashier's check or wire transfer. 18 The entire 
process can be completed in three to six weeks. 19 
The viatical business first emerged in 1988,20 and in a 
relatively short period of time the number of viatical settle-: 
ment companies has grown to approximately fifty-eight in 
1994. Of these fifty-eight companies, over half are located in 
California, New York, Florida, and Texas.21 These fifty-eight 
13. The medical records release used by Life Benefactors includes within its scope 
"all past, present, or future medical information or knowledge of medical information, 
medical reports, physical examination reports, hospital reports, laboratory reports, 
options concerning [the applicant's] health, or X-ray reports relating to [the applicant] 
or [his) health." Id. at 7. 
14. For a discussion of the difficulties of predicting PWA life expectancies, see 
infra Part 11.B.l. · 
15. See LIFE BENEFACTORS, L.P., MOST OFTEN AsKED QUESTIONS AND THEIR 
ANSWERS [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS] (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Berner, Note, Beating the Grim Reaper, or Just Confusing 
Him? Examining the Harmful Effects of Viatical Settlement Regulation, 27 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 581, 584 (1994) (noting that "(a] purchaser usually pays aviator 
fifty to eighty percent of the policy's value"). 
17. See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 15. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Quint, supra note 11, at D2. 
21. AB of March 13, 1995, California had 12 viatical companies, New York had 
7, and Texas and Florida each had 6 companies. Viatical Set~lement Firms (unpub-
SUMMER 1995) Regulating Viatical Settlements 935 
companies purchased approximately $300 million worth oflife 
insurance policies, or nearly 4000 policies, in 1994. 22 Most 
companies are quite small, having the capacity to purchase 
only five to ten million dollars in policies. 23 The exception, and 
probably the leader of a trend toward larger providers, is 
Chicago-based Viaticus, which expects to purchase up to $500 
million in policies within the next five years. 24 
This rapidly growing industry has come under increasing 
scrutiny by state insurance regulators and legislators, largely 
because of the high profits that viatical settlement companies 
have been earning, which some regulators see as a sign of 
abuse.25 Neither proponents nor opponents of regulation 
seriously dispute the existence of better-than-average profits 
for viatical companies, although both groups have their own 
motives for acknowledging high returns. Critics· of viatical 
settlements rail against such profits in their attacks on the 
industry, while viatical companies trumpet unusually large 
returns in their investment promotional materials. Both groups 
have obvious incentives to overstate profit margins. The 
estimate of average profits most frequently cited in news 
reports places them at nearly twenty percent of the face value 
of the policy, with profits on individual viatical settlements 
sometimes exceeding forty percent. 26 These returns, coupled 
with the fact that, at first glance, viatical settlements seem to 
lished list supplied by the National Association of People With AIDS) (on file with the 
Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (tabulations by the author). 
22. Quint, supra note 11, at D2. 
23. Id. 
24 .. Id. 
25. The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that the way 
some companies sell viatical settlements to investors renders them " 'investment 
contract' securities," which require registration under the Securities Act of 1933. See 
SEC Files Fraud, Registration Claims Based on Sale of Death Benefit Interests, 26 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1203, 1203 (1994). At least one commentator has disagreed with 
the SEC's conclusion. See Shanah D. Glick, Comment, Are Viatical Settlements Securi· 
ties Within the Regulatory Control of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 
957, 958 (1993) (concluding that "whether brokered or nonbrokered, viatical settle-
ments are not securities and therefore are not subject to the regulatory control of the 
'33 Act"). 
26. See Berner, supra note 16, at 585; Quint, supra note 11, at D2. But see 
Melinda Fulmer, •Knocking on Heauen's Door": ALI Offers Financial Security to the 
Dying, SAN ANTONIO Bus. J., June 24, 1994, § 1, at 1 (stating that the "return on a 
viatical investment can be as high as 14 percent"). 
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be a "ghoulish business,"27 have lead ten states to enact legisla-
tion regulating the viatical settlement industry28 and several 
more to consider it. 29 
As states seek the proper regulatory stance, disagreement 
has grown over the degree of regulation warranted. This Note, 
in contrast to other commentators who have concluded that 
much of viatical settlement regulation is a bad idea,30 applies 
a rigorous analysis to existing and proposed viatical settlement 
regulations, concluding that those _few states that currently 
regulate viatical settlements should adopt minimum payout 
regulations and that those states that have no viatical regula-
. tions in place would be well-served to adopt the regulatory 
scheme discussed. Part I argues that consumer protection 
rationales justify current licensing and disclosure regulations 
in the few states that have them. Part II explores the contro-
versial proposals for minimum payout regulations of viatical 
settlement providers and concludes that such regulations, if 
carefully crafted, are warranted. Finally, Part III examines an 
alternative to viatical settlements-accelerated benefits provi-
sions in life insurance policies-and concludes that accelerated 
benefits, while often preferable to viatication, do not signal the 
eventual obsolescence of viatical settlements. 
Two important points must be noted before examining regula-
tions aimed at informational inequalities in viatical markets. 
First, one of the unsettling aspects of the viatical settlement 
industry is that discussing viatical settlements in terms of profit 
and risk necessarily dehumanizes the PW As involved in these 
transactions. What viatical settlement providers consider to be 
"risks," PWAs see as sources of great hope-that they will live 
27. Quint, supra note 11, at Dl. 
28. Those ten states include the following: California, CAL. INS. CODE§§ 10113.1-.2 
(West 1993); Louisiana, 1995 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1976 (West); Minnesota, 1995 Minn. 
Sess. Law Serv. 270 (West); New York, N.Y. INS. LAW§§ 7801-7810 (McKinney Supp. 
1995); North Carolina, 1995 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 615; North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE 
§§ 26.1-33.1 (1995); Oregon, 1995 Or. Laws Ch. 342; Texas, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 
4672 (Vernon) (amending TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50-6A (West Supp. 1995)); Vermont, 
VT. STAT. ANN tit. 8, §§ 3826-3834 (Supp. 1995); and Washington, 1995 Wash. Legis. 
Serv. 403 (West). 
29. For example, two bills were proposed in the Florida legislature but died in 
committee. S. 1688, Reg. Sess. (1995); H.R. 1207, Reg. Seas. (1995). There is pending 
legislation in Illinois. H.R. 1796, 89th Gen. Assembly (1995) (as amended), and in 
Pennsylvania, H. 1551 (1995). The Missouri Senate proposed legislation that ultimately 
died in committee. S. 184, 88th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1995). The list of states 
with proposed legislation is a growing one. 
30. See, e.g., Berner, supra note 16, at 582; Dean, supra note 1, at 122. 
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longer than their doctors' predictions and that a cure for AIDS · 
will be found. In the language of the viatical settlement 
industry, viatical settlements "mature" when the PWA dies, 
and the sooner the PWA dies, the greater the viatical 
company's profit. This Note attempts to emphasize the 
humanity of the viator as often as possible-something the 
language of the industry often makes difficult to do. 
Second, it is important at the outset to recognize the limi-
tations ofviatical settlements, and of other life insurance-based 
approaches, as solutions to the financial problems of PW As. 
Such approaches are available only for those who own life 
insurance and thus are unavailable to those PWAs with the 
most dire financial need-America's urban poor and the great 
majority of intravenous drug users. Viatical settlements are 
undoubtedly an important development in meeting the finan-
cial needs of the large number of PW As who are fortunate 
enough to own life insurance, but they are by no means a 
financial panacea for all PWAs. 
I. CORRECTING INFORMATIONAL INEQUALITIES: 
THE CASE FOR DISCLOSURE 
The bulk of current state regulation of viatical settlements 
focuses on providing potential viators with enough information 
to make an informed choice to viaticate.31 Such regulation has 
faced little resistance, with even the most laissez-faire industry 
group proclaiming that it "encourages viators to become in-
formed."32 This lack of resistance may result from the fact that 
"information policies 'do not necessarily impose great costs on 
concentrated interests such as individual producers."'33 This 
Part examines the major information disclosure requirements 
of existing state regulation, as well as the model regulation of 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 
and concludes that all these requirements can be justified as 
reasonable consumer protection measures and should therefore 
be adopted in more states. 
31. See infra Part l.B. 
32. NATIONAL VIATICAL Ass'N, INFORMATION BOOKLET 6 (1994) [hereinafter NVA 
INFORMATION BOOKLET] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform). 
33. IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER PROTECTION TEXT AND MATERIALS 70 (1989). 
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Unequal information is recognized as a justification for 
limited market regulation. In consumer markets similar to the 
viatical settlement market, "information gaps between buyer 
and seller" can be a source of market failure, because "markets 
need adequate information on prices, quality and terms if they 
are to function efficiently."34 As a result, the absence of equal 
information "may create a role for regulation of market trans-
actions. "35 
When asymmetric information exists within a consumer 
market, 
information remedies [as opposed to direct regulation of 
terms] will usually be the preferable solution. Remedies 
which simply adjust the information available to consumers 
still leave consumers free to make their own choices, thus 
introducing less rigidity into the market. Such remedies 
leave the market free to respond as consumer preferences 
and production technologies change over time.36 
This asymmetry may result from the fact that consumer 
information is a public good, and the provider of the informa-
tion will have a difficult time preventing non-paying customers 
from gaining access to it.37 "This suggests that in consumer 
markets there will be an underprovision of information and a 
shortage of fully informed consumers."38 Viatical companies 
have some incentive to provide viators with information, 
because doing so may distinguish one company from its com-
petitors. 39 For example, member companies of the National 
Viatical Association (NV A) attempt to gain a competitive 
advantage by agreeing to uphold a "Code of Ethics" and list of 
"Standard Business Practices" which require that signatories 
provide certain information to potential viators.40 Notwith-
standing such efforts, "[t]he public good characteristics of 
34. Id. at 36-37. 
35. DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 62 (1989). 
36. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 
J.L. & ECON. 491, 513 (1981). 
37. RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 42. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. NVA INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 32, at 15-16. The NVA's Standard 
Business Practices require member companies to disclose the effects of viatical 
settlements on government benefits, tax implications ofviatication, and accelerated 
benefits options. Id. at 15. 
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information might provide a prima facie rationale for govern-
ment subsidisation of the provision of consumer information. "41 
In seeking to provide information to consumers, however, the 
proper goal should not be perfect information, which would be 
too costly to provide, but rather adequate information.42 Justi-
fying the disclosure requirements of viatical legislation thus 
depends on whether or not PWAs possess inadequate informa-
tion, either because the present market does not provide it or 
because what information the market does provide is so 
complex that viators have difficulty understanding it.43 The 
former reason is more relevant here, because viatical settle-
ments are, at least from the viator's perspective, a fairly 
straight-forward transaction. 44 
Three remedies may address the informational inequalities 
in· the viatical market: (1) removing existing restraints on 
information; (2) correcting misleading information; and (3) 
requiring additional information.45 Only the latter two reme-
dies are of importance, because there are no substantial re-
straints on information in viatical markets. Because existing 
and model regulations make effective use of these remedies, 
more states should adopt similar requirements. 
A. Correcting Misleading Information 
In an effort to prevent viatical companies from disseminating 
misleading information, the NAIC's Model Regulation (Model 
Regulation) of viatical settlement advertising provides that 
viatical advertisements "should be truthful and not misleading 
by fact or implication."46 In addition, the regulations require 
that advertisements which "emphasize[] the speed with which 
.the viatication will occur ... must disclose the average time 
frame from completed application to the date of offer and from 
acceptance of the offer to receipt of the funds by the viator."47 
41. RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 42. 
42. Id. at 41. 
43. Id. at 41-42. 
44. For a discussion of the factors which make overreaching byviatical companies 
possible, see infra Part 11.D. 
45. See Beales et al., supra note 36, at 514. 
46. VIATICAL SE'ITLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION § 6(H)(l) (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. 
Comm'rs 1994) [hereinafter VIATICAL SE'ITLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION). 
47. Id. § 6(H)(2). 
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This regulation is aimed at early viatical providers who 
claimed to make cash immediately available. The Model 
Regulation further provides that "[i]fthe advertising emphasiz-
es the dollar amounts available to viators, the advertising shall 
disclose the average purchase price as a percent of face value 
obtained by viators contracting with the advertiser during the 
past six (6) months."48 These provisions are justifiable efforts 
to correct misleading information through the provision of 
additional information to viators-information which will allow 
PW As to make more informed decisions to viaticate. 
B. Requiring Additional Information 
Imperfect consumer information can result in a "misal-
location of consumer resources."49 Ifviators do not have infor-
mation about alternatives to viatical settlements, they may 
viaticate when doing so will not maximize the value of their 
insurance policies. To ensure that viatication is the best option 
for the PWA, all ten existing state laws50 and the NAIC's Model 
Act (Model Act) require that the viatical company inform the 
applicant of "alternatives to viatical settlement contracts ... 
including, but not limited to, accelerated benefits."51 The Model 
Act and existing state laws also require that viatical companies 
inform the applicant of the tax treatment of the viatical settle-
ment.52 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a private 
letter ruling in 1994 stating that amounts received from 
viatical settlements must be included as part of taxable in-
come.53 Part of the Republican "Contract with America," the 
48. Id. § 6(H)(3). 
49. RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 42-43. 
50. See supra note 28. 
51. E.g., VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 8(A); CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10113.2(d)(l) (West 1993); N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807(b)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1995); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(1) (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of accelerated benefits as 
an alternative to viatical settlement, see infra Part III. 
52. E.g., VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 8(B); CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10113.2(d)(2); N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807(b)(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(2). 
53. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994). The IRS determined that the settle-
ment amount received by the viator is taxable to the extent that it exceeds his 
adjusted basis in the insurance contract. Id.; see also Darlene Chandler, IRS Letter 
on Taxation of Policy Sold to Viatical Co., NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Feb. 20, 1995, at 22 
(discussing Private Letter Ruling 94-43-020). 
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Contract with America Tax Relief Act of 1995,54 would amend 
the Internal Revenue Code to exempt from taxation both 
viatical settlements and accelerated benefits by terminally ill 
people,55 who are defined as those with life expectancies of 
twenty-four months or less.56 The bill was passed by the House 
of Representatives and awaits action in the Senate. 57 
Viatical companies also must inform applicants of viati-
cation's "consequences for interruption of public assistance."58 
Money received from a viatical settlement counts as income 
and will result in an interruption of means-based government 
benefits, including Medicaid, food stamps, and Supplementary 
Security Income (SSI).59 The mere possibility of viatication, 
however, generally does not count as a source of income to 
which government agencies can require a person applying for 
assistance to turn.60 Similarly, New York law provides that 
health care facilities and practitioners cannot "coerce or require 
54. H.R. 1215, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
55. Id.§ 221; see also 'Contract' Contains Viaticals Clause, INS. REGULATOR, Jan. 
16, 1995, at 8 (discussing the Senior Citizens' Equity Act, which would provide 
favorable tax treatment of accelerated death benefits). 
56. H.R. 1215, supra note 54, § 221(a). 
57. 2 Cong. Index. (CCH) 35,016 (Sept. 1, 1995). 
58. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE§ 10113.2(d)(3); N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807(b)(4); see also 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(4); VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 
8(B). The Viatical Settlements Model Act and the Vermont statute are not as vague 
as the California and New York statutes. Compare VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL 
ACT, supra note 9, § 8(0) (requiring that the applicant be informed of"[t)he fact that 
receipt of a viatical settlement may adversely effect [sic] the recipient's eligibility for 
Medicaid or other government benefits or entitlements and that advice should be 
obtained from the appropriate agencies") and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(4) 
(requiring that the applicant be informed of "[t]he fact that receipt of proceeds from 
a viatical settlement may adversely affect the recipient's eligibility for Medicaid or 
other government benefits or entitlements, and that advice should be obtained from 
the appropriate agencies") with CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(d)(3) (requiring that the 
applicant be informed of the "[c)onsequences for interruption of public assistance") 
and N.Y. INS. LAW § 7807(b)(4) (same). 
59. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 15. Life Benefactors' pamphlet advises 
that "[s]ome transactions may be structured to prevent loss of means-based benefits." 
Id. 
60. New York law provides that, in determining eligibility for and the amount 
of public assistance, including aid for dependent children and Supplementary Security 
Income, 
[t)he department shall not consider the availability of an option for an acceler-
ated payment of death benefits ... or an option to enter into a viatical settle-
ment ... as an available resource ... provided, however, that the payment of 
such benefits shall be considered in determining eligibility for and amount of 
such assistance. 
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 366(2)(b)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1995). 
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or attempt to coerce or require any person ... to enter into a 
viatical settlement ... as a condition of admission, providing[,] 
or continuing care."61 
Other disclosure requirements include informing the viator 
that the proceeds of the settlement "could be subject to the 
claims of creditors,"62 and that the viator has the right to 
rescind the settlement within a specified period.63 Viatical 
companies also must disclose the "date by which the funds will 
be available to the viator and the source of the funds."64 In 
New York, viatical companies must disclose "the identity of any 
person who will receive any fee or compensation from the 
viatical settlement company with respect to the viatical settle-
ment and the amount and terms of such compensation."65 New 
York also requires that viators be informed "how viatical 
settlements operate, "66 a somewhat ambiguous requirement. 
Vermont requires that the viatical company disclose "[t]he fact 
that the viatical settlement contract is null and void if the 
viatical settlement provider fails to tender payment of the 
proceeds as provided in the viatical settlement contract."67 
Finally, although no state regulation currently requires it, 
viatical companies should be required to disclose to viators the 
fact that if the viator secures a disability waiver of premium,68 
either on his own or at the request of the company, the 
61. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW§ 20(2) (McKinney Supp. 1995). 
62. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(3); VIATICAL SE1TLEMENTS MODEL ACT, 
supra note 9, § 8(C). Neither California nor New York require disclosure of this 
information. See CAL. INS. CODE§ 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807. 
63. Under the Model Act, that period is 30 days after execution or 15 days after 
receipt of the funds, whichever is less. VIATICAL SE1TLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 
9, § 8(E). The rescission period is 15 days after receipt offunds in New York, N.Y. INS. 
LAW § 7807(b){5), and 7 days after execution in Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 
3831(5). In California, although the viator has 15 days after execution of the settle-
ment to rescind, CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(n), the viati.cal company is not explicitly 
required to disclose this right, because the provision is not in the disclosure section 
of the statute. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(d). 
64. E.g., VIATICAL SE1TLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 8(F); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 8, § 3831(6). California and New York do not require disclosure of this information. 
See CAL. INS. CODE§ 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807. 
65. N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7807(b)(6). 
66. Id. § 7807(b)(l). 
67. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831(7). Section 3832(e) states the conditions under 
which a viatical.settlement contract is deemed void. Id. § 3832(e). 
68. A disability waiver of premium in a life insurance contract typically provides 
"that if the insured becomes disabled, ... the insurer will waive the payment of 
premiums that become due on the policy during the continuance of disability, however 
long disability may last." MURIEL L. CRAWFORD, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE 
CONTRACT 206 (1994). 
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company's administrative costs decrease, and the viator should 
receive a slightly higher payout. 
All of these disclosure requirements seek to ensure that the 
viator does not operate in a state of ignorance of his legal 
rights under the states' viatical regulations and of the conse-
quences of viatication. Simply requiring disclosure, however, 
is not enough. The timing of the disclosure of information can 
have a substantial impact on whether that information has its 
intended effects. The NAIC's Model Act mandates that disclo-
sure of all required information be made "no later than the 
date the viatical settlement contract is signed by all parties."69 
Vermont's law similarly requires disclosure "prior to the 
execution of the viatical settlement contract by the viator."70 
These provisions would allow viatical companies to disclose 
important information-such as alternatives to viatication, the 
effects of viatication on means-tested government benefits, and 
the taxability of the settlement-very late in the process, at a 
point when the viator is unlikely to pull out to explore other 
options or carefully consider the information that he has just 
been given. This is a serious flaw in the NAIC's Model Act and 
Vermont's statute, one which requires correction. California 
has recognized this defect and instead requires that all disclo-
sures be made "at the time of solicitation for the viatical settle-
ment. "71 New York similarly requires disclqsure " [ u] pon receipt 
of an application for a viatical settlement."72 States adopting 
their own regulations should follow the lead of California and 
New York in this respect. 
C. Licensing Requirements 
The Model Act and all existing state statutes require that 
viatical providers be licensed by the state's insurance com-
missioner.73 An application for a license must include a li-
censing fee74 and must disclose the identity of shareholders, 
69. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 8. 
70. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3831. 
71. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(d)(l) (emphasis added). 
72. N.Y. INS. LAw § 7807(b) (emphasis added). 
73. See, e.g., VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 3(A); CAL. INS. 
CODE § 10113.2(b)(l); N.Y. INS. LAW§ 7802(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(a). 
74. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 3(B). The amount of this 
licensing fee varies widely from state to state. California's initial licensing fee is 
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partners, officers, and employees of the viatical company. 75 
After the filing of the application, the insurance commissioner 
generally is given the power to investigate such people regard-
ing their character, competence, experience and training, and 
business reputation and to issue a license upon finding the 
applicants to be worthy in these categories.76 Because viatical 
companies occupy a· position of trust and confidence with 
viators,77 who entrust to companies confidential medical infor-
mation and large sums of money, a licensing requirement is a 
reasonable way to ensure the trustworthiness of viatical 
providers. 
Once a company has been granted a license, the insurance 
commissioner is empowered to revoke or refuse to renew it for 
a number of reasons, including misrepresentations in the 
application for the license,78 fraudulent or dishonest practices 
or incompetence in conducting business,79 a pattern of unrea-
sonable payments to via tors, 80 conviction of a crime involving 
fraud or moral turpitude,81 or violation of any provision of the 
state's viatical settlement act.82 In addition to the disclosure 
requirements, a licensed viatical company is typically required 
$2833, with an annual renewal fee of $177. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(l), (3). New 
York's initial fee is $2500, with an annual renewal fee of $1000. N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 7802(b)-(c). Vermont's initial fee is only $50, with an annual renewal fee of the same 
amount. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(b)-(c). 
75. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 3(0); CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10113.2(b)(l); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7802(d); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(d). 
76. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 3(F); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 7802(0; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(0. California vests additional discretion in its 
commissioner, allowing him to deny a license application if "it is determined that it 
is contra'ry to the interests of the public to issue a license to the applicant." CAL. INS. 
CODE § 10113.2(b)(l). 
77. The National ViaticalAssociation acknowledges in its statement of standard 
business practices that representatives of viatical companies have fiduciary duties. 
NVA INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 32, at 16. 
78. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(l); N.Y. INS. 
LAW§ 7803(a)(l); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(l). 
79. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(2); N.Y. INS. 
LAW§ 7803(a)(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(2). 
80. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(3); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(3). 
81. E.g., VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(4); N.Y. INS. 
LAW§ 7803(a)(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(4). 
82. E.g.,VlATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4(A)(5); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 7803(a)(4); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3828(a)(5); cf CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(2) 
(providing that the commissioner can revoke or refuse to renew a license if granting 
or continuing the license is "contrary to the interests of the public"). 
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to file for the insurance commissioner's approval a copy of all 
viatical settlement forms used by the company.83 
Although one commentator has suggested that licensing 
viatical settlement companies "impair[s] aviator's right to sell 
their [sic] insurance policies,"84 most members of the industry 
accept licensing and other regulation as a necessary step to 
lend accountability and credibility to the growing industry.85 
The staunchly anti-regulation National Viatical Association 
(NV A), which in 1994 represented over half of the nation's 
viatical companies,86 has become something of a fringe group, 
with the number of member companies it represents dropping 
to fifteen as of early 1995. 87 The Viatical Association of Ameri-
ca (VAA) apparently has ascended to take the NVA's place as 
the industry's leader, embracing as a reasonable cost of doing 
83. E.g., VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 5; CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10113.2(c). 
84. Berner, supra note 16, at 59. In making this argument, Ms. Berner adopts 
the arguments of fringe members of the viatical settlement industry who claim that 
regulation ofviatical settlements is an infringement of the viator's right to alienate 
freely his property. See, e.g.' NATIONAL VIATICAL Ass'N, UNTITLED (n.d.) (stating that 
regulation of viatical settlements is a "needless infringement on the rights of 
individual citizens") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
Interestingly, only viatical companies, and not viators, have promoted this property 
rights argument. The only "right" with which licensing interferes is a consumer's right 
to undertake a major economic transaction with possibly unscrupulous and unaccount-
able viatical companies. See Sean Armstrong, AIDS and the Trusted Advisor, BEST'S 
REV., Sept. 1994, at 40. Armstrong quotes former Iowa Insurance Commissioner David 
Lyons as saying that" 'the veil on (the property rights argument] is pretty thin. If you 
talk to most insureds, their concern is that we do not unduly restrict a market.'" Id. 
85. See, e.g., Jim Connolly, Viatical Cos. Seem Ready to Embrace Regulation, 
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Nov. 28, 1994, at 21 (noting that "(t]he general sentiment of 
those in the viatical settlement industry is that greater regulatory scrutiny will make 
the business more credible and profitable"); see also Viatical Ass'n of Am., Viatical 
Settlement Companies Form New Trade Association (Press Release) (Feb. 24, 1995) 
[hereinafter Press Release] (noting that the 26 member companies of the Viatical 
Association of America (V AA) "unanimously voted to support the efforts of state 
insurance commissioners to regulate the viatical industry based on the Viatical 
Settlements Model Act") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform). 
86. Cynthia Crosson, N. Y. Viatical Companies Face Tough New Regulation, NAT'L 
UNDERWRITER, Aug. 8, 1994, at 3. 
87. Letter from Michelle L. Saxty, Administrative Director, National Viatical 
Association, to the author (Mar. 1, 1995) (including list of "Member Companies in 
Good Standing" as of Feb. 13, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform). NV A members who disagreed with Brian Pardo, the Association's 
president who is an outspoken opponent ofviatical regulation, recently attempted to 
oust him as president. An Official Says Industry Can Police Policy-Buying, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 14, 1994, at 02. When the VAA held its inaugural meeting in Chicago and 
decided to exclude Pardo, Pardo tried unsuccessfully to get an injunction to prohibit 
the meeting. Id. 
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business all the provisions in the NAIC's Model Act, but not 
the NAIC's minimum payout regulations.ss 
By narrowing the information gaps between PWAs and 
companies, the information disclosure requirements of state 
and model regulations help ensure that PWAs have the infor-
mation needed to confirm that viatication is the best option 
available to them. Although providing such information is not 
costless, it is inexpensive, requiring companies to do little more 
than print an informational sheet to -be given to all applicants 
and keep viators informed throughout the settlement process. 
Licensing viatical settlement providers will help keep unscru-
pulous operators out of an industry which, much like the 
securities industry, involves a fiduciary relationship between 
the client and the company. These proposals are all reasonable 
and effective methods for the protection of viators. 
II. PRICE REGULATION OF VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS: 
Is MINIMUM PRICE REGULATION NEEDED? 
According to the best estimate, a viatical settlement company 
averages about twenty percent profit on a policy's face value. s9 
It is important to emphasize, however, that print news reports 
are the only source of data on viatical company profits. This 
lack of hard data on viatical profits requires that an assump-
tion be made, and an assumption of a twenty percent average 
profit margin is reasonable based on available reports.90 
88. See Press Release, supra note 85. While the VAA supports the provisions 
contained in the NAIC's Model Act, it does not support the NAIC's Model Regulation 
of minimum payouts. Telephone Interview with William Kelley, Executive Director, 
Viatical Association of America (Apr. 21, 1995). Its members believe that those 
regulations do not fully take account of the risk viatical companies assume. Id. For 
disagreement with that position, see infra Part 11.B. 
89. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
90. If this assumption overstates viatical profits, it does so by not much more 
than 5%. Certainly, no one has ever suggested that viatical companies are averaging 
less than 10% profit. Even with profits around 15%, it does not necessarily follow that 
viatical regulation would do more harm than good. Whether profits average 15% or 
20%, the conclusions reached in Part I, supra, about licensing and information 
disclosure requirements would remain unchanged, since those requirements impose 
minimal costs on viatical settlement companies. 
A lower profit average, however, could effect the analysis of minimum payout 
regulations that follows. If the average profit margin ofviatical companies is actually 
15%, the minimum payouts required by the NAIC's Model Regulation at the least 
would have to be adjusted downward. If companies actually are profiting only 15% 
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These reported average profits of twenty percent have resulted 
in a call for regulations setting minimum payouts to viators.91 
Such minimums are by far the most controversial facet of 
viatical settlement regulation. The disagreement focuses on 
what many perceive to be the windfall profits that viatical 
companies reap at the expense of viators and others argue are 
legitimate business ear~ings ... Whether corrective action is 
needed depends on whether these windfalls truly exist and, if 
they do, on what one concludes is the source of these windfalls. 
The priority of any approach, whether it is a minimum payout 
regulation or the laissez-faire approach favored by some com-
mentators,92 should be to protect PWAs from making a bad 
bargain in the sale of their policies while at the same time 
preserving viatication as an option. No consideration is given to 
the goal of maximizing viatical investor returns, although 
recognition is given to the necessity of ensuring reasonable 
returns on investment and, to the extent necessary, a risk-
reward sufficient to attract viatical investors. Whether minimum 
payout regulations can set a proper balance between these 
considerations is the key question. 
This Part explores three possible explanations of windfall 
profits for viatical providers. First, windfall profits may not in 
fact be windfalls at all. Low payouts by viatical companies might 
be necessary to ensure a reasonable profit in light of the sub-
stantial risks taken by viatical companies. Second, if profits are 
indeed disproportionate to risk, they may be the result of a 
temporary supply-demand lag in the viatical market. If this lag 
causes windfall profits, minimum payout regulation might harm 
competition by discouraging companies from entering the 
market, thereby preventing the increase in supply that would 
result in reasonable profits to investors and larger payouts to 
viators. Finally, windfall profits may result from longer-term, 
on average, requiring them to increase payouts might drive them out of business by 
making it difficult for them to attract investors. That result is clearly contrary to the 
intent of the regulatory scheme envisioned in this Note. But average profits of 15% 
do not necessarily mean that minimum payout regulations are per se unwarranted. 
They still might be reasonable as a way of keeping renegade viatical companies from 
making manifestly unfair purchase offers to unwary PW As. 
91. Minimum payout regulations also can be characterized as maximum price 
regulations: requiring a company to pay the via tor 70% of the policy's face value in 
effect limits the viatical company's "price" to a maximum of 30% of the policy's face 
value. One must be careful, however, not to equate "price" with "profit." See infra Part 
11.B. 
92. See sources cited supra note 30. 
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invidious causes that wouldjustify minimum payout regulation, 
such as overreaching by viatical · companies. Which of these 
sources most nearly approximates the reality of the market will 
determine the proper regulatory response. 
A. The NAIC Model Regulation 
The NAIC hinted that minimum payout regulations might be 
in the works when it included in its Viatical Settlements Model 
Act a provision empowering state insurance commissioners to 
"[e]stablish standards for evaluating the reasonableness of 
payments under viatical settlement contracts."93 Other states 
with viatical settlement legislation followed suit, adopting pro-
visions empowering the state insurance commissioners to set a 
reasonable payout schedule.94 
Not long after adopting the Model Act, the NAIC began 
drafting minimum payout standards. Initially, the NAIC pro-
posed minimum payouts, based on the viator's life expectancy, 
according to the schedule shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 195 
NAIC DRAFT MINIMuM PAYOUT MODEL REGULATION 
LIFE ExPECTANCY MINIMuM PAYOUT 
(MONTHS) (%FACE VALUE) 
<6 90 
6 to <12 85 
12 to <18 75 
18 or more 70 
In its final form, the NAIC adopted a version of the regulation 
which extended its reach to viators with longer life expectancies 
and which dramatically reduced the minimum payouts re-
quired under the initial version. The regulation as adopted, and 
93. VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § lO(B). 
94. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(f); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3833(2). 
95. VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL REGULATION§ 4 (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 
Draft Feb. 16, 1994) [hereinafter MODEL REGULATION Draft] (on file with the 
Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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recently as enacted in Louisiana96 and Minnesota,97 sets mini-
mum payouts according to the schedule in Table 2 .. 
TABLE 298 
NAIC MINIMUM PAYOUT MODEL REGULATION 
I LIFE ExPECTANCY I MINIMUM PAYOUT I (MONTHS) (% FACE VALUE) 
<6 80 
6 to <12 70 
12 to <18 65 
18 to <24 60 
24 or more 50 
In both the draft and final versions of the model regulation, 
viatical companies can deviate from the minimum figures by up 
to five percentage points if the insurer's financial rating is lower 
than the four highest categories.99 
The reasons behind the changes in the NAIC model regulation 
should be clear. A regulation which requires a viatical company 
to pay a minimum of seventy percent of a policy's face value to 
a person with a twenty-month life expectancy may effectively 
preclude viatication for that person, because the company may 
not be able to cover its risks adequately in the thirty percent 
margin that the regulation allows and thus may not enter into 
such settlements. By reducing the minimum payout requirement 
to fifty percent for people with life expectancies of twenty-four 
or more months, the NAIC presumably sought to ensure that 
viatical companies have the flexibility to cover their risks when 
dealing with people with life expectancies that exceed eighteen 
96. 1995 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1979 (West). 
97. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 274 (West). 
98. VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL REGULATION, supra note 46, § 4; see also Model 
Rule Sets Viatical Minimums, INS. REGULATOR, Oct. 3, 1994, at 8, 8 (discussing the 
minimum payout schedule). 
99. MODEL REGULATION Draft, supra note 95, § 4; VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL 
REGULATION, supra note 46, § 4. The relevant rating is that given by the A.M. Best 
Company or "a comparable rating by another rating agency." Id. A.M. Best analyzes 
the performance of the insurance industry. See generally A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S 
INSURANCE REPORTS, PROPERTY-CASUALTY, UNITED STATES (1995) (providing ratings 
and statistical data based on an insurance company's annual financial statement). 
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months. The adopted regulation is thus more finely tuned to the 
viatical market than the draft version. 
B. Are Viatical Companies Reaping Windfall Profits? 
Viatical companies and some commentators have attempted 
to justify the low payouts of viatical companies by pointing to 
the substantial risks that viatical companies assume.100 These 
risks come from many sources, some substantial and others 
chimerical. Whether viatical companies reap windfall profits. 
depends on whether these risks are substantial enough to 
explain the current level of payouts. 
1. The Risk of Misestimating Life Expectancy-The primary 
risk to viatical companies derives from the possibility that 
viators will outlive the companies' best estimates of their life 
expectancies. Although a company has access to and bases its 
estimate of the viator's life expectancy on an evaluation of his 
entire medical history, 101 it will likely rely heavily on the viator's 
CD-4 cell count in determining his life expectancy.102 As AIDS 
progresses, a person's CD-4 cell count decreases and, with it, the 
body's ability to stave off infection.103 
The cost to via ti cal companies if the via tor outlives the compa-
ny's life expectancy prediction can be quite substantial. What 
many perceive to be woefully inadequate payouts may in fact 
represent the margins necessary to compensate viatical compa-
nies for the risk that viators will outlive the company's best life 
expectancy estimates and thereby cut into viatical investors' rate 
100. E.g., Dean, supra note 1, at 142-43 (stating that critics oflow viatical payouts 
"fail to account for the costs and risks associated with viatication [sic] investment"). 
101. See supra note 13. 
102. This reliance stems from the fact that CD-4 cell counts correlate strongly with 
susceptibility to infection. See Lawrence K Altman, New Study Questions Use of AZT 
in Early Treatment of AIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at Al [hereinafter 
Altman, New Study] (discussing effectiveness of treating AIDS before symptoms de-
velop). CD-4 cells are the specialized immune cells that fight infections in human 
blood. Id. at A2. A healthy human has a CD-4 cell count of approximately 1000 cells 
per cubic millimeter of blood. Id. Under the most recent definition of AIDS provided 
by the Centers for Disease Control, a person infected with the HIV virus who has 200 
or fewer CD-4 cells per cubic millimeter of blood has AIDS. See Stefano Vella et al., 
Differential Survival of Patients with AIDS According to the 1987 and 1993 CDC Case 
Definitions, 271 JAMA 1197, 1197 (1994); Lawrence K Altman, Federal Health 
Officials Propose an Expanded Definition of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at B9. 
103. See Altman, New Study, supra note 102, at A2. CD-4 count is not always a 
reliable predictor of life expectancy. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text. 
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of return or perhaps even cause a loss. Whether this risk is 
great enough to justify low viatical payouts thus depends on the 
medical question of the accuracy of predictions of PW As' life 
expectancies. 
The life expectancy of a PWA, from diagnosis of full-blown 
AIDS until death, typically ranges from one to three years, with 
two years being average. 104 A PWA, however, may live as many 
as five to seven years longer than that average. 105 "AIDS, like 
most other chronic diseases, does not follow regular rules of 
disease expression or mortality."106 Professor Osborn notes that 
"CD4 counts are quite good predictors of a person's susceptibility 
to opportunistic infections, which in turn tend to be the poten-
tially lethal factors in AIDS; however, many people have lived 
for a long time with virtually no CD4 cells AND no [opportunis-
tic infections] ."107 As a result, "the individual variation in clinical 
course is so wide that prediction about life expectancy is very 
uncertain for a given person."108 
The uncertainty is further complicated by the variability 
which results from CD-4 tests themselves. As a result of this 
variability, 
[a] single [CD-4) test ... does not allow very accurate predic-
tions. A series of tests reduces the variability and improves 
the prognostic power. If you consider getting prognosis of 
death within a one year period good, the prognostic power 
of repeated tests is pretty good. You could never, however, 
get down to predicting to the month.109 
104. See Male AIDS Patients Are Living Longer, Healthier, AIDS ALERT, July 1993, 
at 107 (reporting a study which found that "participants diagnosed with AIDS since 
1988 have an average length of survival of 24 months compared to 11.6 months for 
participants diagnosed in 1984"). 
105. See id. at 108 (discussing PW As surviving more than six years after infection). 
106. Electronic mail message from Professor June E. Osborn, M.D., University of 
Michigan, School of Public Health, to the author (Apr. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Osborn 
message) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
107. Id.; see also Barbara J. Turner et al., CD4+ T·Lymphocyte Measures in the 
Treatment of Individuals Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1: A 
Review for Clinical Practitioners, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1561, 1565 (1994) 
("Although AIDS-defining complications are common once the CD4+ count is less than 
[200 cells per cubic millimete·r of blood), the association of CD4+ count and risk of 
death in persons with AIDS is not as well defined."). 
108. Osborn message, supra note 106. 
109. Electronic mail message from Professor James Koopman, M.D., University 
of Michigan, School of Public Health, to the author (Apr. 20, 1995) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also Turner et al., supra note 107, 
at 1564 {"Using information from more than one [CD-4 test) offers a ... strategy to 
reduce the impact of laboratory and intraindividual variation in [CD-4) counts."). 
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The possibility of misestimation of any given PWA's life ex-
pectancy is therefore quite substantial. 
Nevertheless, while CD-4 counts cannot be accurate predictors 
of a particular PW A's life expectancy, the fact remains that, on 
average, CD-4 counts are quite reliable. A particular viator may 
outlive a viatical company's estimation ofhis life expectancy and 
cut into the company's profit margin. Over many via tors, howev-
er, the same company should have a fairly good prediction 
record and a correspondingly good profit record. For every PWA 
who lives a year longer than a viatical company predicted he 
would live, another PWA will die a year sooner than the same 
via ti cal company predicted. The inaccuracies of CD-4 counts can 
cut both ways. As the president of one viatical company noted, 
"I've seen a guy with a [zero] T-cell count go two years, and I've 
seen one with a 260 T-cell count die in eight days."110 
If a via tor outlives the company's estimation of his life expec-
tancy, the effect that his survival can have on viatical company 
profits can be quite substantial. Table C shows the present value 
to a viatical company of a $100,000 life insurance policy paid a 
given number of years in the future. 
TABLE 3111 
PREsENT VALUE OF $100,000 LIFE INSURANCE POLICY 
PAID ONE TO FOUR YEARS IN THE FU'nm.E, WITH 
RATE OF RETuRN AsSUMPTIONS 
YEAR 5% 10% 15% 20% 
1 $95,200 $90,900 $87,000 $83,300 
2 $90,700 $82,600 $75,600 $69,400 
3 $86,400 $75,100 $65,800 $57,900 
4 $82,300 $68,300 $57,200 $48,200 
110. Eric Zicklin, Financial AIDS, SPY, Feb. 1994, at 14, 16. 
111. Figures are calculated by the author from data in WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH 
BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 63 tbl. 1-7 (1993). Dollar amounts in italics are 
payout amounts that would be acceptable under the NAIC's model minimum payout 
regulation for a PWA with a life expectancy of one year, allowing $3000 for the viatical 
company's administrative costs. For a discussion of the sources of the roughly $3000 
in administrative costs born by the viatical settlement company, see infra Part 11.B.3. 
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Table 3 shows, for example, that if a viatical company desired 
at least a 15% return on its investment, it would pay no more 
than $75,600 now for a $100,000 life insurance policy payable 
in two years. Most importantly, what initially appears to be a 
25% profit turns out to be a 15% profit when the time-value of 
money is taken into account. Table 3 also shows that if the 
company had known that the viator would live for three years 
instead oftwo,112 it would have paid only $65,800 (or about 66% 
of face value) for his policy to maintain its 15% rate of return. 
This $9800 contingency cuts into the company's profits and is 
a risk that all viatical companies must bear. 
To minimize the risk of net losses, viatical companies have 
been insisting on relatively low payouts.113 By doing so, they 
ensure that, even if the viator outlives their best estimate of his 
life expectancy, they still have a large margin of error before 
their miscalculation results in a net loss. A viatical company 
which maintains this margin of error can still earn a positive 
rate of return-even if it is only around five percent-if the 
viator substantially outlives its best estimate of his life expec-
tancy. 
Of course, a five percent rate of return might not be enough 
to please investors who could have earned at least that much 
in no-risk investments in government bonds. Investors will 
insist on a higher return for the risk that they are taking, but 
they likely will be willing to risk a five percent return when a 
viator lives substantially longer than expected for the chance of 
a thirty percent return when a viator dies before expected. 
Consider the effect of the NAIC's Model Regulation114 in the 
following hypothetical. Sam, a PW A, applies to ABC Viaticals, 
a viatical settlement provider, to viaticate his $100,000 life 
insurance policy. After ABC Viaticals's physicians review all of 
Sam's medical history, they determine that his life expectancy 
is approximately one year. On that basis, ABC Viaticals offers 
and Sam accepts a viatical settlement of $80,000-an amount 
that exceeds the NAIC's minimum payout model regulation by 
112. A few viatical companies recently have shown a willingness to accept policies 
of persons with life expectancies that exceed two years, although none have been 
willing to go beyond three years. See James Daw, U.S. Firm Seeks Inuestors in Death: 
Millions Made on Life Insurance of Terminally Ill, TORONTO STAR, May 27, 1994, at 
El, ES; Josephine Marcotty & Glenn Howlatt, Terminally Ill Can Use Cash to Pay 
Bills, Fulfill Dreams, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Nov. 14, 1993, at lD. 
113. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra Part II.A tbl. 2. 
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fifteen percent.115 If ABC Viaticals's physicians have predicted 
Sam's life expectancy correctly, the company will have realized 
approximately a twenty percent return, even after allowing 
$3000 for the company's administrative costs. 116 That twenty 
percent return at the end of the future year equals a profit of 
roughly $17 ,000. If Sam lives only six months, ABC Viaticals 
earns 40% return on its investment. 
If, in spite of the best estimates of ABC Viaticals's physicians, 
Sam lives two years instead of one, the company still receives 
more than a ten percent return on its investment. If Sam lives 
three years, ABC Viaticals would still receive a return of approx-
imately five percent on its initial $100,000 investment. In fact, 
only if Sam lives for four years does the company realize less 
than a five percent return on its purchase of Sam's insurance 
policy. Thus, the NAIC's minimum payout regulations leave 
ample room for ABC Viaticals to profit handsomely, while still 
protecting Sam from a grossly inadequate payout. 
Two factors thus are relevant in concluding that the risk of 
the viator's extended survival does not warrant the current level 
of viatical payouts and that the NAIC's Model Regulation sets 
appropriate payout minimums. First, misestimations resulting 
from reliance on CD-4 counts will balance out across many 
PW As over time. On average, the company's predictions will be 
reasonably accurate, and its overall profits reasonably stable. 
Second, the NAIC's minimum payout regulations provide ample 
room for profit in the face of extended viator survival, allowing 
the viator to substantially outlive his life expectancy without a 
net loss to the company. The risk that the viator will outlive the 
viatical company's best estimate of his life expectancy does not 
explain the low payouts currently offered by viatical companies. 
2. Other Risks-Viatical companies assume other risks in 
the settlement process for which they should receive reasonable 
compensation. The financial stability of the viator's insurance 
company is one such source of risk. If the insurance company 
folds, or otherwise defaults on its obligations under the policy, 
the viatical company might be left with a valueless policy: it has 
paid to become the beneficiary of a policy that will not be paid. 
Many states, however, protect policyholders against insurer 
defaults by assuming financial responsibility for the policy 
115. See supra Part II.A tbl. 2. 
116. See supra Part 11.B. l tbl. 3. For a discussion of administrative costs, see infra 
Part 11.B.3. Of course, the provider's administrative costs go up as the viator lives 
longer. 
SUMMER 1995) Regulating Viatical Settlements 955 
benefit in the event that the insurer becomes insolvent. Viatical 
companies themselves can protect against the risk of default by 
the insurer by only purchasing policies issued by highly rated 
insurance companies. Companies that wish to buy less highly-
rated policies, however, should be encouraged to do so, because 
by so doing they make viatication an option for more PW As. The 
NAIC Model Regulation provides such encouragement. Section 
Four of that regulation allows viatical companies to take account 
of the risk of default in the settlement amount by lowering their 
payout by five percentage points if the via tor's insurance compa-
ny has an A.M. Best rating lower than the four highest rat-
ings.117 
Beyond default, any factor that could distort the accuracy of 
the viatical company's estimation of the viator's life expectancy 
is a source of risk for a viatical company. The possibility that a 
cure will be found for AIDS, or that better life-lengthening AIDS 
treatments will develop, are two such risks. Like the risk that 
the viator will outlive the company's prediction of his life 
expectancy, a life-prolonging treatment for AIDS could result in 
a diminished return or net loss to the viatical company. 
Although the "risk" of an AIDS treatment or cure118 may be 
a real threat to the long-term viability of the viatical settlement 
companies, those risks are probably not very substantial at the 
level of the individual viator. A <;:ure for AIDS, if found, might 
117. See supra note 99. 
118. Recall the reminder in the Introduction of this Note that one of the more 
disturbing aspects of the viatical settlement industry is that improved AIDS treat-
ments and cures become a "risk," not a benefit. This fact can have disturbing public 
policy implications. Consider "notoriously anti-gay" Texas State Representative 
Warren Chisum, who has invested $200,000 in viatical settlements and who has 
"voted against ... a variety of ... programs to help AIDS victims." Molly Ivins, Death 
Futures Trade a Sad Wrinkle in Capitalism, HOUSTON POST, Mar. 16, 1994, at A27 
(editorial). There is considerable danger in having "someone shaping public policy who 
has an open monetary interest in seeing that the [AIDS] epidemic continues and that 
no cure is found." Id. 
The NAIC's Model Regulation contains a conflict-of-interest rule providing that 
"[v]iatical settlement providers and brokers shall not solicit investors who could 
influence the treatment of the illness of the viators whose coverage would be the 
subject of the investment." VIATICAL SETI'LEMENTS MODEL REGULATION, supra note 
46, § 6(G). It is arguable that the viatical companies that solicited Representative 
Chisum's investment would fall within this regulation. The emphasis of the regulation 
is on the "illness of the viator," not the viator himself, so it would seem that § 6(G) 
would not require that Chisum be able to influence a particular viator's treatment, 
as long as he could influence the treatment of that viator's illness. Whether this 
regulation would apply to Chisum thus depends on whether "treatment" is limited 
to direct medical care, or whether it includes, for example, legislation that would 
provide free treatment to PWAs. 
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mean that viatical companies can no longer viaticate the policies 
of PWAs, but it will not likely mean that those PWAs whose 
policies the companies already own will be cured. 119 A cure for 
AIDS probably would help HIV-positive individuals and only 
those PW As who are in the earlier stages of AIDS. AIDS may 
have progressed too far in many viators, for whom a cure 
tragically may come too late. Moreover, a cure for AIDS would 
by no means signal the end of the viatical settlement industry. 
The ongoing diversification of viatical companies into policies of 
terminal cancer patients and other terminally ill people lessens 
the exposure of viatical companies to the possibility of a cure or 
life-prolonging treatment for AIDS and a consequent decline in 
business. 
Finally, one purported source of risk should be discredited. 
Although some commentators have claimed that viatical compa-
nies should be compensated for the risk of litigation by disap-
pointed prior beneficiaries or those with legal interests in the 
policy,120 these risks are largely nonexistent. Revocable benefi-
ciaries under a life insurance policy have no legal right to 
enforce, and thus no claim to bring, when the viator replaces 
them with the viatical company as beneficiary.121 To minimize 
the risk oflitigation further, viatical companies require anyone 
who does have an interest in the policy to sign a written release 
of their interest before the company accepts the policy for 
viatication. 122 As a result, litigation brought by someone with 
prior ownership or some other legal interest in the policy rarely 
will occur. Even if it does occur, it likely will be dismissed 
because of the waiver. 
That this risk oflitigation is minimal has been born out by the 
case law reported to date. Of the four reported cases involving 
viatical companies, none has been brought by a disappointed 
former beneficiary.123 In fact, one of those cases, Goldberg u. 
119. See Zicklin, supra note 110, at 14 (quoting the vice president of a California 
viatical settlement company as saying "[elven if a cure for AIDS were found tomorrow, 
no one with a 24-month life expectancy could be helped"). 
120. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 1, at 135 n.87, 142 & n.110. 
121. See CRAWFORD, supra note 68, at 244 (noting that policyowners can terminate 
at will the rights of a revocable beneficiary). 
122. See, e.g., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 15. 
123. See, e.g., SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 94-1861, 1995 WL 517641, at *2 
(D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1995) (involving the SEC's case against defendant viatical company 
alleging that the company violated various provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Stephens v. Meininger (In re Credit Life Corp.), 
184 B.R. 839, 840 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (involving a policyholder who sought 
reversal of bankruptcy court's imposition of a stay on his civil suit against viatical 
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Miller, 124 pitted viatical companies against each other. In 
Goldberg, aviator completed a viatical settlement only to learn 
that another viatical company was willing to pay him a substan-
tially higher settlement.125 The viator asked the initial company 
to rescind its agreement with him and allow him to enter into 
the agreement for a greater amount with the second company.126 
The initial company eventually agreed, accepting its money back 
plus an additional amount to cover costs, 127 but then brought a 
claim for tortious interference with contractual relations against 
the second viatical company.128 The court held that no tortious 
interference with contract had occurred because there had been 
no underlying breach of contract by the viator. 129 If Goldberg is 
any indication, viatical companies apparently risk litigation with 
competitors over who signed the viator first more than they risk 
litigation by prior beneficiaries or people with property interests 
in the viator's policy. 
3. Administrative Costs-A viatical company must pay 
significant administrative costs for each policy it viaticates. One 
source places the average administrative cost at $3000 per 
viatication.130 These costs derive from mailing and telephone 
expenses, legal fees incurred in the viatication process, including 
the expense of securing releases from prior beneficiaries, and the 
fees of the physicians who conduct a review of each PWA's 
medical history. 131 
These administrative costs also include the viatical company's 
expenditures in paying the viator's insurance premiums between 
viatication and death. The via ti cal company, however, does not 
always incur this expense. Many insurance policies offer a 
disability waiver of premium, under which the insurer or the 
company to determine ownership of his life insurance policy); Protective Life Ins. Co. 
v. Sullivan, 892 F. Supp. 299, 300 (D. Mass. 1995) (involving a suit by a life insurance 
company against a viatical company alleging that the policyholder initially procured 
the policy through fraud and misrepresentation); Goldbergv. Miller, 874 F. Supp. 874, 
876 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (involving a viatical company's suit against a policyholder and a 
competitor company for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract, 
respectively). This list of cases is based on a search of the Allcases database on 
Westlaw in November 1995. 
124. 874 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
125. Id. at 875-76. 
126. Id. at 876. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 875. 
129. Id. at 879. 
130. Carole C. Lamson, Legal Introduction to Living Benefits in Life Insurance: 
New Perspectives and Developments, N.Y. STATE B.J., Nov. 1993, at 16, 16. 
131. Id. at 16-17. 
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policyholder's employer agrees to take over the policyholder's 
payment of premiums in the event that the policyholder becomes 
disabled and unable to pay the premium himself. 132 If the 
viator's policy offers such a waiver of premium and the viator 
has not exercised the waiver option, the viatical company will 
encourage, though probably not require, the viator to secure the 
disability waiver. If the viator secures the waiver before 
viaticating his policy, the viatical company will not have to take 
over payment of the policyholder's premiums upon viatication 
and should therefore increase its payout to the viator. 133 
All of these risks and costs are real and substantial, but they 
are not substantial enough to explain the current low level of 
viatical payouts, which result in an average profit of around 
twenty percent after administrative expenses have been taken 
into account.134 Of course, taking all of these risks and costs into 
account strongly refutes the initial reactions of the press and 
some commentators that viatical companies enjoy no-risk, 
windfall profits at the expense of PWAs. Yet,· even after an 
exhaustive and detailed look at the risks and costs of viatical 
settlements, the fact remains that viatical companies' profits are 
disproportionate to the risks that they take and the costs that 
they bear, and they cannot be explained wholly on those bases. 
In spite of this evidence, student commentators, some advo-
cates for PW As, and representatives of most viatical companies 
have adopted a laissez-faire approach to minimum payout 
regulations, displaying a Friedmanesque reverence for the power 
of market competition.135 For the most part, these people resem-
ble Chicago-school economists, who "tendD to be rather more 
sanguine than other economists about the proximity of real 
132. CRAWFORD, supra note 68, at 206. 
133. NVA INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 32, at 9. Companies "should" increase 
their payments but do not necessarily do so. There is plenty of room for viatical 
companies to require that the viator secure the disability waiver without increasing 
its payout offer. Viators might not realize that, by exercising the waiver, they are 
providing a substantial benefit to the viatical company for which they should be 
compensated in the settlement. 
134. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
135. See, e.g., Freeman Statement, supra note 2, at 787 (emphasizing marketplace 
notions of efficiency and receiving the best price for the insurance policy); Berner, 
supra note 16, at 600 (arguing that, "by discouraging higher settlement offers, the 
operation of minimum rate regulations denies via tors the benefits of the competitive 
nature of the open market"); Dean, supra note 1, at 147 (arguing that minimum 
payout regulations "deny [companies] reasonable profit margins" and will reduce 
competition); supra note 88 (discussing the fact that the Viatical Association of 
America does not support minimum payouts). 
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world markets to the perfect state. Correspondingly, [they] 
tendD to be slower than others to perceive the need for correc-
tive action."136 Average profits of twenty percent, not wholly 
explained by risk and higher than investments of comparable 
riskiness, can be deemed "supernormal" profits. But calling 
viatical profits "supernormal" does not by itself make a case for 
minimum payout regulation. For example, these profits may be 
the result. of a temporary supply-demand lag in the viatical 
market, or they may be a proper reward for the innovation of 
viatical settlement companies. If a supply-demand lag is the 
cause, minimum payout regulation might harm competition by 
discouraging companies from entering the market, thereby 
preventing the increase in supply that would result in more 
reasonable profits to investors and larger payouts to viators. If 
viatical settlements remain an innovation; supernormal profits 
might be a proper reward for that innovation and therefore 
worth maintaining for the time being. The next section explores 
possible market explanations for and functions of supernormal 
viatical profits, seeking to determine whether the viatical 
market is as close to the perfect state as is assumed by other 
commentators and whether minimum payout regulation would 
be beneficial or harmful to the viatical market under those 
alternative explanations. 
C. An Industry-Wide View of the Viatical 
Settlement Industry 
Large profit margins like the twenty percent average margin 
enjoyed by the viatical settlements industry suggest that the 
market is not performing as it should. Such "persistent ... 
excess or supernormal profits are generally signs of unworkable 
performance."137 The ideal performance for an industry "should 
move as long-run averages toward amounts just sufficient to pay 
normal interest returns on owners' investments, plus a 'risk 
reward' to successful firms sufficient to offset the losses of 
unsuccessful ones."138 "Supernormal profits" are thus profits 
which are disproportionate to risk and to normal interest 
136. A.J. DUGGAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: A CRITIQUE OF THE 
CHICAGO SCHOOL CASE AGAINST INTERVENTION 17 (1982). 
137. JOE s. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 14 (1968) (emphasis added). 
138. Id. 
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returns in other industries and investments.139 The fac~ that 
supernormal profits have been the norm in the viatical settle-
ments market suggests a lack of workable competition which 
might necessitate regufatory intervention. 
Professor Bain has suggested that supernormal profits in an 
industry can result from four causes:·· 
1. Misestimation of future demand or cost, or lagging adjust-
ment to changing demand or cost, resulting in positive 
"windfalls" to firms or industries .... 
2. The riskiness of business investment in various lines, 
resulting in the payment of"risk rewards" to successful risk-
takers (but also in losses to the unsuccessful gamblers). 
3. The introduction ofinnovations ... by some firms, result-
ing in "reward to innovation [sic]." . . . 
4. Monopolistic or monopsonistic restriction of output and 
raising of selling prices in relation to costs by the industry 
140 
Determining which of these dynamics explains the supernormal 
profits enjoyed by the viatical industry will go a long way in 
determining the proper regulatory response, if indeed any reg-
ulatory response is warranted. Before examining each of these 
explanations, however, it will be useful to reexamine briefly the 
current development of the viatical settlement market. 
1. The Current Landscape of the Viatical Market-The first 
viatical settlement company commenced business in 1988.141 In 
a relatively short period of time, the number of companies grew 
to approximately fifty-eight in 1994. Of these fifty-eight compa-
nies, over half are located in California, New York, Florida, and 
Texas.142 As a result of this concentration of companies, the 
competitiveness of the market for viaticals varies naturally and 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 397-98. 
141. Quint, supra note 11, at D2. 
142. AB of March 13, 1995, California had 12 viatical companies, New York had 
7, and Texas and Florida had 6 companies each; the remaining 27 were located in 
Alabama (1), Georgia (3), Illinois (3), Kansas (1), Kentucky (1), Louisiana (2), 
Maryland (2), Massachusetts (1), Michigan (1), Minnesota (1), Missouri (2), New 
Jersey (1), North Carolina (1), Ohio (4), Utah (1), and Virginia (2). Viatical Settlement 
Firms (unpublished list supplied by the National ABsociation of People With AIDS) 
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (tabulations by the 
author). 
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substantially from state to state. Viatical companies can buy 
policies nationwide, 143 and many advertise their toll-free tele-
phone numbers in nationally circulated gay publications like The 
Advocate and Poz, a magazine for HIV-positive gay men. These 
fifty-eight viatical companies together purchased approximately 
$300 million worth of life insurance policies, or nearly 4000 
policies, in 1994.144 Most companies are rather small, having the 
capacity to purchase only five to ten million dollars in policies. 145 
2. The Supply-Demand Lag-With only fifty-eight rela-
tively small viatical companies in business in 1994, the supply 
of settlements may have lagged far behind demand. When 
supernormal profits result "because· considerable time is 
necessarily consumed in expanding capacity to meet an expe-
rienced increase in demand"-a "supply-demand lag"-they 
"are justifiable as a necessary incident of the efficient working 
of a market system under dynamic conditions with uncertainty, 
and desirable as incentives to hurry a more appropriate 
adjustment of supply to demand."146 If there is far greater 
demand for viatical settlements than the existing viatical 
settlement companies can provide, and supernormal viatical 
profits result from this supply-demand lag, minimum payout 
regulation might take away needed incentives for new firms 
to enter the viatical industry. 
Information that can determine the level of development of 
the viatical industry is quite sparse, but that does not render 
all conclusions unduly speculative. The supply that viatical 
settlement companies currently are able to provide is a fraction 
of the demand for via ti cal settlements. in 1994, viatical compa-
nies bought fewer than 4000 policies.147 Safely assuming that 
the 4000 policies represent a small fraction of the number of 
terminally ill people who in 1994 owned life insurance and 
who, had they known of the possibility of viatication, would 
have elected to viaticate, it follows that the demand for viatical 
settlements vastly exceeds the supply that existing viatical 
143. Those states that license viatical companies require licensure not only of 
companies located in the state but also of companies that buy policies of viators 
residing in the state. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.l(d), .2(b)(l); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 7802(a), (0(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3827(a), (0(4). 
144. Quint, supra note 11, at D2. 
145. Id. 
146. BAIN, supra note 137, at 398. 
147. Quint, supra note 11, at D2. 
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companies can provide. 148 This assumption is borne out by 
anecdotal evidence from a viatical representative, who stated: 
"'We have more sellers than we can possibly handle .... There 
are about five policies available for every single-policy buy-
er.' "149 Although the viatical industry is growing at· a· rapid 
pace, it will be years before companies can attract enough 
investment to approach the demand for viatical settlements. 
Because a supply-demand lag exists, viatical companies can 
pay less for policies than they would have to pay in a more 
competitive market. Minimum payout regulation in such an 
underdeveloped market actually could harm PW As. The simple 
but powerful argument put forth by members of the viatical 
settlement industry and some advocates for PWAs contends: 
"The natural dynamics of the marketplace force [viatical] 
companies to strive for the efficiency that will allow them to 
offer the largest settlement. "150 Minimum payout regulations 
reduce viatical companies' supernormal profits, thereby remov-
ing the incentive for new companies and investors to enter the 
viatical market. This results in little new competition for 
existing companies and also stagnates the number and amount 
of payouts available to the terminally ill. The solution, oppo-
nents of regulation claim, lies in allowing the competitive 
pressures of the free market to drive settlement amounts 
higher. 151 Low payouts to viators are the result of a temporary 
lack of competition. By allowing the market to develop unfet-
tered by minimum payout regulation, new companies will 
continue to enter the market, competition will increase, and 
higher payouts to viators and more reasonable returns for 
viatical investors will result. 
This argument may be correct and at least calls for great 
caution in setting minimum payout levels. It does not, however, 
lead necessarily to the conclusion that any minimum price 
regulations would diminish substantially the incentives to 
enter the viatical market. Whether ·minimum payout regu-
lations will have the feared effect of diminished entry depends 
entirely upon where the minimum payout is set. If minimum 
148. See Fulmer, supra note 26, § 1, at 1 ("The fact that not many firms are 
competing for the business means that there is little pressure to give clients larger 
cash settlements .... "). 
149. Zicklin, supra note 110, at 17 (quoting the president of a New York viatical 
settlement company). 
150. Freeman Statement, supra note 2, at 787. 
151. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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payouts are set too high, they would take away much of the 
incentive for new firms to enter the viatical industry and could 
thereby prevent the increased supply that would result in 
larger payouts to viators and more reasonable profits to inves-
tors. Setting minimums too low would preserve incentives to 
enter the viatical market but would vitiate much of the con-
sumer protection effects that provided. the impetus behind 
regulation in the first place. The challenge is to set minimum 
payouts that preserve (but necessarily diminish) incentives to 
entry and still provide meaningful protection for PWAs. 
The NAIC's draft minimums too strongly favored viators and 
likely would have had a substantial adverse effect on entry 
incentives.152 The draft regulations allowed little room for the 
viator to outlive his life expectancy and still provide the 
viatical company with a return commensurate with that risk. 153 
The NAIC wisely rejected them. The minimums actually 
adopted by the NAIC, however, will not likely have a substan-
tial effect on incentives for entry and will provide a significant 
measure of protection for viators. 154 As discussed earlier, those 
minimums allow significant room for the viatical company to 
earn a healthy return even on a viator who significantly 
outlives his life expectancy.155 One cannot say that new viatical 
companies will cease to attract investors in the face of these 
regulations, when the regulations still make possible favorable 
rates of return. The more skilled the company becomes at 
accurately predicting the life expectancy of the PW A, the 
greater the company's profit on the policy. Although the 
minimum payout regulations surely will make viaticals less 
attractive to investors than they were with no regulation, even 
payout-regulated viatical settlements will remain a profitable 
investment under the NAIC's model. 
Although supernormal profits may result from a lag between 
the supply of settlements which viatical companies can provide 
and the demand for settlements which currently exists, the 
NAIC's minimum payouts will not interfere unduly with market 
development. Moreover, the supply-demand lag might be only 
partly responsible for supernormal profits. Such profits also 
might result from something more invidious-like overreaching 
152. See supra Part II.A tbl. 1. 
153. See supra Part II.A. 
154. See supra Part II.A. tbl. 2. 
155. See supra Part 11.B.1. 
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by viatical companies-that makes minimum payout regulations 
desirable as a consumer protection measure.156 
3. Profit as a Risk-Reward-Professor Bain's second cause 
of supernormal ·industry profits is "the riskiness of business 
investment. "157 The risk that the via tor will substantially 
outlive the viatical company's best estimate of his life expectan-
cy158 justifies a risk-reward but is not substantial enough to 
explain the twenty percent average profit which viatical 
companies currently enjoy.159 The problem with viewing the 
supernormal profits of the viatical industry as a proper 
risk-reward is that, over a period of time, in a properly func-
tioning market, "the risk rewards earned by successful firms 
should be at least roughly offset by the losses of unsuccesful 
[sic] firms."160 Although only a few viatical firms have failed, 
the losses of the few companies that have failed do not 
approach the profits of those that have succeeded.161 A 
risk-reward was justified in the first years of the viatical 
industry, as companies entered an uncertain and highly 
speculative market characterized by legal uncertainty. Now, 
with no state prohibiting viatical settlements seven years after 
their creation, and with the NAIC's model regulation in place, 
that climate of uncertainty has waned considerably. 
4. Rewards for Innovation-A reward to viatical companies 
also might be justified in the first years of the industry, not as 
a risk-reward but as a reward for innovation. This is Professor 
Bain's third explanation for supernormal profits. 162 While 
supernormal profits may exist to reward entrepreneurs for the 
innovation of viatical settlements, innovation rewards should 
not be long term. 163 "Such rewards should emerge as the 
156. Part 11.D infra considers this possibility. 
157. BAIN, supra note 137, at 397. 
158. See supra Part 11.B.1-2. 
159. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
160. BAIN, supra note 137, at 399. 
161. At least one of the viatical firms that failed did so willfully, by taking the 
money of PW As and disappearing with it. See Nan Lee, Was Insurance Policy Buyout 
a Rip-off? AIDS Victims Sue Viatical Firm for Fraud, DAILY REP. (Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 
Fulton County, Georgia), Mar. 21, 1994, at 1, 2 (noting one PWA who dealt with a 
corrupt viatical settlement company and who settled for only $45,000 for a policy with 
a $180,000 face value, only $31,000 of which was actually paid to him). Unfortunately, 
while reports of successful viatical firms abound, the failings of viatical firms rarely 
are reported. Only when a viatical firm bilks viators out of their money and then 
closes does the press pay attention. See, e.g., id. at 2-3. 
162. BAIN, supra note 137, at 397-98. 
163. Id. at 400. 
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successful innovator 'leads the parade' in . . . increasing 
revenue with a new product, enjoying some period of extra 
profits until he has been fully and successfully imitated by 
other firms in his industry."164 The viatical industry is young, 
but not so young that all viatical firms are "innovators" worthy 
of a reward for innovation. The existence of nearly sixty 
viatical companies suggests that the initial innovators have 
been "successfully imitated by other firms" and that the time 
for supernormal profits as a reward for innovation has since 
passed. 165 As Professor Bain notes, "true rewards to innovation 
... should not favor all firms, or even all principal firms, in an 
industry equally."166 Supernormal viatical profits therefore 
cannot be explained on this basis. 
5. Monopsony167-Even though supernormal profits result 
at least partly from a supply-demand lag, there remains the 
possibility that supply may never catch up with demand, or 
that it may catch up only after an unacceptably long period. In 
spite of the existence of nearly sixty viatical companies, a 
monopsonistic market structure might exist. This is Professor 
Bain's final cause of supernormal profits: 168 
[T]he only sort of excess profits that tend to be reflected in 
long-term average profits for entire industries are monopo-
listic excess profits. All other types of excess profit are 
likely to occur sporadically and irregularly, or to be con-
fined to only part of the firms of an industry .169 
One viatical company representative hinted that viatical 
companies enjoy a monopsony when he stated that "[t]here are 
more policies here [in the United States] than we could ever 
afford to buy."170 Of course, viatical companies looking for 
investors have obvious incentives to overstate their potential 
164. Id. 
165. See id. 
166. Id. at 401. 
167. Ifviatical settlements·are considered a service sold by a viatical settlement 
company to the viator, then monopoly would be the correct term here. If viatical 
settlement companies are considered not as sellers of a service but as buyers of life 
insurance policies, then monopsony is the correct term. Either characterization is 
plausible, but the author thinks the latter more accurately depicts the viatical settle-
ment industry. 
168. BAIN, supra note 137, at 398. 
169. Id. at 401. 
170. Daw, supra note 112, at El, ES (quoting Frederick Hollander, vice-president 
of the Florida viatical company United Benefits). 
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for growth; but there is also truth in the viatical representa-
tive's statement. Although the number of PW As who have life 
insurance and are financially strapped is unknown, viatical 
companies purchased only around 4000 policies in 1994.171 That 
number is much lower than even a conservative estimate of the 
number of policies available in the pool offinanc~ally strapped 
PWAs with life insurance. When the number of PWAs. is 
combined with the more than 500,000 terminal cancer patients 
who die each year in the United States, 172 it quickly bec~mes 
clear that it will be a long time before the viatical industry can 
catch up to demand. 
It may be that this supply-demand lag which currently 
makes large profits possible is not at all temporary, but likely 
to stretch years into the future. The possibility of monopsony 
also argues for minimum payout regulation as the only way to 
restrain companies from exploiting their superior position in 
the market to reap high profits at the expense of the terminally 
ill. 
6. A Narrowing Market-The fact that viatical settlements 
are not the only source of money to which some PWAs can turn 
in order to lessen their financial strain decreases concerns 
about the superior position of viatical firms in relation to 
demand. The life insurance industry's aggressive response to 
the proliferation of viatical settlement companies through the 
rapid expansion of accelerated benefits increasingly and 
substantially will reduce the demand for viatical settlements, 
as well as provide an alternative-and in many respects superi· 
or-source of funds. 173 From 1991 to 1994, the number of life 
insurance companies offering an accelerated benefit option 
increased ninety percent, from 113 to 215 companies.174 The 
expanded availability of accelerated benefits also likely will 
slow new entries into the viatical market. 
Nevertheless, viatical settlements will remain an option for 
PWAs when an accelerated benefit arrangement is impossi-
ble-that is, when the PWA has a life expectancy of more than 
171. See Quint, supra note 11, at 02. 
172. Id. 
173. For a more detailed discussion of the accelerated benefits option, see infra 
Part III. 
174. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INS. & LIMRA INT'L, ACCELERATED DEATH 
BENEFITS: 1994 UPDATE 4 & fig. 1 (1994) [hereinafter ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE) 
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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12 months.175 Because most accelerated benefits options limit 
the amount 'the policyholder can accelerate to fifty percent or 
less of the policy's face value,176 PWAs who accelerate may also 
be able to viaticate the portion of their policy that remains 
after acceleration. For example, a PWA possibly can receive by 
means of acceleration up to fifty percent of his policy's face 
value and still viaticate the remaining fifty percent. The 
availability of accelerated benefits thus does not signal the end 
ofviatical settlements, even for those PWAs whose life expec-
tancies are short enough to make acceleration possible. 
Viatical company profits cannot be explained as a reward for 
innovation but can be explained partially as both a risk-reward 
and the result of a supply-demand lag. These partial explana-
tions mandate considerable caution in setting the level of 
minimum· price regulations, but they do not rule out such 
regulations. The possibility of a monopsonistic market struc-
ture argues in favor of minimum price regulation. When the 
possibilities for overreaching explored in the next section are 
considered, the case for minimum price regulations becomes 
stronger. 
D. Overreaching 
Even ifthe supply-demand lag in the viatical market is only 
temporary, the potential for supernormal profits still might 
exist once the supply of via ti cal settlements has caught up with 
demand. "Overreaching'' by viatical companies in their dealings 
with vulnerable PW As might support minimum payout regula-
tion even if payouts ·will increase as more firms enter the 
viatical industry. Overreaching occurs when an unscrupulous 
viatical firm takes advantage of a PW A's compromised emo-
tional state and desperate financial situation to gain a more 
favorable settlement for itself than it otherwise could obtain 
from a fully informed and rational decision maker, for whom 
obtaining money is not a matter of life or death. 
To the extent that minimum payout regulations grow out of 
a desire to protect PW As from overreaching, they are pater-
nalistic, and paternalism seems to be an unsound foundation 
175. See infra Part III. 
176. See infra Part III. 
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for regulation. But what some dismiss as paternalism actually 
relates to concerns about the ability of certain consumers to 
make rationaljudgments. 177 H.L.A. Hart defended paternalism 
as an acknowledgment of "'a great range of factors which 
diminish the significance to be attached to an apparently free 
choice."'178 Only if one believes that consumers always make 
rational judgments can one dismiss the concerns about over-
reaching that minimum payout regulations attempt to address. 
All but the most stringent adherents to unrestrained 
competition recognize that there are situations in which inter-
ference with free market forces protects consumer interests and 
that consumers are not always rational economic decision 
makers. 179 Efficiency analysis presupposes that "[e]ach individ-
ual in the market is ... the best judge of his own interests and 
[can] act rationally, maximising his utility."180 This model of 
the rational economic decision maker may not be appropriate 
for some PWAs. PWAs who viaticate, by definition, have life 
expectancies of two years or less.181 In the face of such pros-
pects, fully informed, rational economic decisions might not 
always be possible. If this happens in enough cases, the as-
sumptions of the efficiency analysis fail, making a prima facie 
case for intervention in the market. 182 
In his report on viatical settlements entitledA System for the 
Exploitation of the Terminally Ill, Joseph Belth noted that 
"persons who are terminally ill, and those close to them, 
probably are undergoing greater stress than they have ever 
experienced. Under those circumstances, they are easily 
confused and may be vulnerable to exploitation."183 The exploi-
tation of which Bel th warned can occur in any number of ways. 
177. According to Iain Ramsay, "the growth of the pejorative connotation of the 
term 'paternalism' is relatively recent." RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 55. 
178. Id. (quoting H.L.A. Hart). 
179. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A 
Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REV. 13, 14 (1992) ("Laissez-
faire policies that leave monopoly or oligopoly power unchecked in private hands 
might allow industry members to raise their prices above the competitive level."). But 
see MILTON FRIEDMAN & RoSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 
222 (1980) (stating that "market competition, when it is permitted to work, protects 
the consumer better than do the alternative government mechanisms that have been 
increasingly superimposed on the market"). 
180. RAMSAY, supra note 33, at 40. 
181. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
183. Joseph A. Bel th, A System for the Exploitation of the Terminally Ill, 16 INS. 
F. 11, 12 (1989) (relating conversation with James A. Neidhart, M.D., director, 
University of New Mexico Cancer Center). 
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The inequality of bargaining power inherent in viatical settle-
ments is a particularly powerful source of exploitation. A PWA 
looking to sell his policy is approaching death and is often 
financially desperate. The ravages of AIDS may have required 
him to quit his job, resulting in loss of income and employer-
provided health coverage. Expensive medications may have 
drained his bank account. 184 As a result, he may willingly 
accept an offer that would be unreasonable by an objective 
standard. Across the table from him sits a viatical company 
possessing detailed information about his health. By one 
estimate, each policy buyer has five policies from which to 
choose for every one it can buy,185 so viatical companies can be 
quite selective about which policies, and which PWAs, they 
select. 
Consider a hypothetical viatical settlement in which a PWA 
seeks cash for his $100,000 life insurance policy. Assume that 
the policy has a cash surrender value of $1500 at the time it 
is viaticated. Given a choice between viaticating or not viati-
cating his policy, the PWA may systematically underestimate 
its value. To the PWA in this position, any payment he receives 
above the cash value of the policy is a windfall, since that 
payment is unavailable to him during his lifetime without a 
viatical settlement. An offer of $55,000 may appeal to this 
PWA because it is $53,500 more than he could receive from the 
cash value of the policy. But an offer of$55,000 is unfair in the 
sense that it is $45,000 less than the value of the policy to the 
viatical company or to the PWA's prior beneficiaries. Thus, to 
the extent that the PWA can perceive the benefits ofviaticating 
his policy as a windfall and the costs of viaticating his policy 
as falling on his prior beneficiaries, the PW A may be vulnera-
ble to overreaching. 
The undervaluing of policies which can occur in viatical 
settlements results from the fact that viatical settlements 
redefine how people should think about their life insurance. To 
most people, life insurance is an asset which they purchase for 
the benefit of others, not themselves. They have had no 
occasion to think of it as an asset that is available for their 
own use, other than at its cash surrender value. As one in-
surance company executive noted of the advent of accelerated 
benefits, "'Up until now, life insurance has been really death 
184. See Dean, supra note 1, at 124-25 (discussing the cost of AIDS medications). 
185. Zicklin, supra note 110, at 17. 
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insurance.' "186 The .same could be said of viatical settlements. 
By making life insurance an asset available to the policyholder, 
viatical settlements require policyholders to adjust their 
attitudes toward their life insurance. 
Policyholders must stop thinking of life insurance solely as 
later benefiting their spouse or partner, children, or other loved 
ones and start thinking of it as an asset that they can use for 
their own benefit during their lives. Until life insurance is 
widely recognized as an asset accessible to the living policy-
holder, people may not value it sufficiently. The insured's 
discovery that he can get substantial sums of money from his 
own life insurance policy may be a pleasant surprise. By 
setting a floor below which the viatical payout cannot fall, 
minimum payout regulations prevent viatical providers from 
taking advantage of that pleasant surprise. Efforts to make 
people aware of the value of their life insurance to them by 
informing them of the possibilities of viatical settlement and 
accelerated benefits should be encouraged along with any 
system of minimum price regulation. 
The incentive to obtain the maximum payout may vary with 
the PWA's intended use of the money, as well as with his life 
expectancy. For example, a PWA with only two years to live 
need not be overly concerned that the money he receives for his 
policy will last three years or four years, as long as it suffices 
for two years. In addition, many PWAs viaticate not to pay 
medical bills or housing costs but to take deservedly extrava-
gant vacations or to buy exotic cars.187 A PWA who wants to 
take a trip to Europe may not care whether he receives enough 
money to fly first-class instead of coach, but a PWA who needs 
to finance his supply of zidovudine (AZT) likely will care 
whether he receives enough to finance another three months' 
supply of the expensive medication. Much more is at stake in 
the latter case. In ~ddition, because the company will offer to 
pay the viator less for his policy as his calculated life expectan-
cy increases, 188 a via tor may not want to bet against himself 
by seeking out a company that determines he has fewer 
months to live, even if it means that he will receive a higher 
payout. Receiving a low payout is in this sense good news, for 
186. Armstrong, supra note 84, at 39 {quoting Prudential Insurance Company of 
America executive, Jim Longo). . 
187. LIFE BENEFACTORS, L.P., VIATICUM {promotional video tape) {on file with the 
Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
188. See supra Part 11.B.l. 
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it means that the company's physicians have determined the 
viator's life expectancy to be relatively long. 
None of this concern with undervaluation, and the overreach-
ing that it allows, means that all or even most PWAs are 
desperate, irrational, and incapable of driving a hard bargain 
for their policies. There is a good deal of truth in the National 
Viatical Association's statement that "[t]erminally ill persons 
are just that, terminally ill; they are not incompetent."189 But 
protecting PWAs from overreaching does not deem them inher-
ently incompetent: it only recognizes that they are often in 
circumstances which make their exploitation more possible. 
Minimum price regulation would make that overreaching 
impossible. · 
Ill. THE ACCELERATED BENEFITS OPTION 
The limits of viatical settlements in providing money to 
PW As and other viators have resulted in a new life insurance 
. product that purports to make viatical settlements· obsolete. 
The insurance industry and many commentators have trum-
peted these "accelerated benefits" provisions in life insurance 
policies as the solution to the money problems of the financially 
strapped terminally ill, and the white knight to save the PW As 
from the supposed exploitation and greed ofviatical settlement 
companies. 190 Although accelerated benefits are preferable to 
viatical settlements in most circumstances, they are not, for 
reasons to be explored in this Part, a total replacement for 
viatical settlements. 
Accelerated benefits are life insurance policy proceeds paid 
by the life insurance company to the policyholder before the 
policyholder dies. 191 For accelerated benefits to be available to 
the policyholder, his policy either must already have an ac-
celerated benefits option written into it, or his insurer must 
189. NVA INFORMATION BOOKLET, supra note 32, at 13. 
190. See, e.g., Nick Ravo, Companies That Buy Life Policies Under Scrutiny, CHI. 
TRIB., July 1, 1994, at C3 (quoting a New York financial planner as stating that 
"accelerated benefits from insurers [are] 'almost always' a better deal than payouts 
from viaticals"). 
191. CRAWFORD, supra note 68, at 184. 
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make the option available through a rider. 192 Most accelerated 
benefits provisions allow the policyholder to accelerate benefits 
under a number of different conditions, the most common of 
which is the "diagnosis of a terminal illness for which death is 
likely to occur within a specified number of months."193 AIDS 
is obviously one such condition. . 
First introduced in the late 1980s, accelerated benefits since 
have exploded in availability. Although only 215 of 446 compa-
nies surveyed by the American Council of Life Insurance and 
LIMRA International offered accelerated benefits in 1994, those 
215 companies included most of the largest companies, holding 
approximately seventy percent of life insurance in force in the 
United States.194 Over eighteen million people were covered by 
policies with accelerated benefits provisions in 1994, and that 
number is considered to be a substantial undercount.195 
The chief advantage of accelerated benefits is that, unlike 
viatical settlements, they cost the policyholder very little 
money. In fact, thirty-two percent of companies offering accel-
erated benefits in group policies do not charge the policyholder 
anything to accelerate.196 Other group policy companies either 
charge the policyholder an additional premium (12%), take the 
fee out of the accelerated benefit paid to the policyholder (20%), 
or treat the payout as a lien and charge interest on the amount 
accelerated (20%).197 For policyholders with individual policies, 
fewer companies charge nothing (25%), and more companies 
have adopted the additional premium (25%), discounted benefit 
(25%), or lien (23%) approaches. 198 Even when the insurer 
charges the policyholder for accelerating benefits, however, the 
192. ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE, supra note 174, at 7. In 1994, 84% of 
accelerated benefits were offered through riders that can be added to existing policies, 
while only 11 % were built into the policies themselves. Id. at 7 & tbl. 5. 
193. Id. at 3. Eighty-three percent of accelerated benefits "products" can be acti-
vated for terminal illness, 12% for a "dread disease," 11% when a need for long-term 
care arises, and 10% for conditions which result in a need for permanent home 
confinement (total exceeds 100% because some products can be activated by more than 
one condition). Id. at 5 & tbl. 2. AIDS, at least in its latter stages, could satisfy all 
of these conditions. 
194. Id. at 4-5. 
195. Id. at 15 & fig. 3. The undercount resulted from the fact that many of the 
companies offering accelerated death benefits could not provide information as to the 
number of policyholders covered by accelerated benefits provisions. Id. Note that those 
18 million people own only .5% of all life insurance policies in force. Quint, supra note 
11, at Dl. 
196. ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE, supra note 174, at 13 & tbl. 17. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. ·at 8-9 & tbl. 8. 
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charge is insignificant when compared to the cost of viatical 
settlement. The Prudential Insurance Company, for example, 
deducts approximately four percent as its charge for accelera-
tion, allowing a policyholder with a $100,000 policy to retain 
$96,000 for himself and his beneficiaries.199 
Obviously, a world in which all terminally ill people had life 
insurance with the option to accelerate benefits for no charge 
would be a great improvement over the current state of affairs. 
The limited availability of accelerated benefits, and limitations 
on exercising the acceleration option when it is available, 
however, leave intact the market for viatical settlements. Even 
if a PWA owns a policy with an acceleration option, strict life 
expectancy and amount limitations may make the option 
unavailable or financially unattractive. 
For example, sixty-seven percent of companies offering 
accelerated benefits require that the policyholder have a life 
expectancy of less than one year in order to accelerate bene-
fits. 200 Thirty percent allow acceleration only by policyholders 
with life expectancies of less than six months.201 This means 
that even PW As who own policies with accelerated benefit 
provisions must sometimes wait for months, while their health 
deteriorates and their bills pile up, to exercise the option. In 
contrast, almost all viatical settlement companies accept 
policies of PW As with life expectancies of up to two years, with 
some companies accepting those with life expectancies up to 
three years.202 
In addition to these time limitations, most insurance com-
panies offering accelerated benefit options restrict the per-
centage of the policy's face value which can be accelerated. 
Fifty-nine percent of companies offering acceleration limit the 
accelerated portion to no more than fifty percent of the policy's 
face value.203 Only twenty-five percent of companies impose no 
limit on the percentage of face value which can be accelerated, 
and only thirteen percent allow more than fifty percent (but 
less than 100%) of face value to be accelerated.204 
199. Ian Brodie, Delicate Issue Blooms into $300m a Year Industry, THE TIMES 
(London), July 19, 1994, at Business. 
200. ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE, supra note 174, at 6 & tbl. 4. 
201. Id. 
202. See supra note 112. 
203. ACCELERATED BENEFITS UPDATE, supra note 174, at 9 & tbl. 9. 
204. Id. 
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One significant advantage of accelerated benefits over viati-
cal settlements is that the unaccelerated remainder of the 
policy, less any fee, goes to the policyholder's named bene-
ficiaries upon his death.205 But that remainder to the 
beneficiaries is not always an advantage, especially if the 
policyholder's financial needs exceed the amount which the 
insurer allows him to accelerate. For example, if only twenty-
five percent of face value is available through acceleration, that 
amount will be substantially less than the amount offered by 
even a low viatical settlement in a market without minimum 
price regulation, notwithstanding the fact that under an 
acceleration option, most if not all of the remaining seventy-
five percent will go to the policyholder's beneficiaries upon his 
death. To a PWA strapped for cash and without children for 
whom to provide a death benefit, the amount offered by a 
viatical company may be more attractive than that offered by 
the acceleration option. 
For many PWAs, however, acceleration will provide, at low 
or no cost, ample cash for their needs, while leaving intact a 
payout to their beneficiaries. Where both viatication and 
acceleration are available options, and where the terminally-ill 
person's policy allows him to accelerate a sum sufficient to 
meet his needs, accelerated benefits are superior to viatical 
settlements. 
Because accelerated benefits are a new product, however, few 
people know of their availability. All state viatical settlement 
acts and the NAIC's Model Act therefore require that viatical 
settlement companies inform prospective via tors of the possibil-
ity of accelerated benefits.206 This requirement seeks to avoid 
a major source of inefficiency in the viaticals market by pre-
venting viators from accepting viatical settlements when 
acceleration would have provided them with more cash. 
Accelerated benefits, while in many ways preferable to 
viatical settlements, are only preferable under quite narrow 
conditions: the policyholder must have purchased life insurance 
from a company that provides the option of acceleration, he 
must have less than one year to live, and his financial needs 
must be satisfiable by whatever fraction of his policy's face 
value acceleration will provide. If those conditions are met, 
205. See CRAWFORD, supra note 68, at 184 (explaining'that an accelerated benefits 
provision may allow payout of part of the death benefit and that the face amount and 
cash value of the policy will be reduced accordingly). 
206. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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acceleration is vastly superior to viatical settlement. If one of 
those conditions is absent, however, a viatical settlement might 
be a more. attractive option. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than a "ghoulish" practice that ought to be banned 
outright, viatical settlements can be a freeing and empowering 
option for PWAs and other terminally ill people. At present, 
however, that freedom can come at too high a price. Licensing 
requirements help to ensure high standards for viatical compa-
nies in a business which by its nature requires the highest 
ethical standards; Disclosure regulations help to ensure that 
PWAs are aware of accelerated benefit options and know the 
financial downsides of viatication. Minimum.payout regulations 
will ensure that viators receive fair payouts for their policies, 
while still allowing viatical investors a reasonable return 
commensurate with the actual risks and costs of the viatical 
business. 

